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Changelings: alterity beyond difference 
 
Magnus Course, University of Edinburgh 
 
 
I’m looking through you; where did you go? 
I thought I knew you; what did I know? 
 
Lennon & McCartney 
We’ll need an abstract here, followed by about 10 keywords.  
 
Bridget Cleary met her death in Ballyvadlea, County Tipperary in March 1895 surrounded by 
her loving family: her father, her husband, her aunt, and her cousins. Yet it was at the hands 
of this same family that she died; tortured, beaten, and finally burnt to death. Then and at the 
subsequent trial, they insisted that it was not Bridget Cleary whom they had killed, but an 
imposter, a cuckoo, a fairy changeling who had stolen Bridget’s place. Her husband Michael 
was convinced that upon the changeling’s death, the real Bridget Cleary would ride out at 
dawn from the old fort at Kylenagranagh on a white horse, giving her kin the opportunity to 
seize her back from the fairies. Bridget Cleary was never to ride out of Kylenagranagh on a 
white or any other colour of horse, and reading the many subsequent accounts of her death, 
perhaps the saddest parts refer to the slow and painful realization among at least some of her 
kin during long years of incarceration that it was not a fairy changeling that they had killed 
and buried in a boggy shallow grave, but Bridget herself.1 
 One hundred years later and five thousand miles away, Jorge’s friends and neighbours 
are deeply concerned. He is becoming poorer and poorer, his body thinner and thinner, he’s 
drinking more and more, and neglecting the few animals and crops he has. Despite the fact 
that Jorge is a bachelor, kawchu, and lives alone in the Mapuche community of Oño Oñoko in 
southern Chile, passers-by hear the sounds of family life coming from within his house.2 For it 
is said that Jorge does indeed have a wife, yet not a real wife, but a pun domo, a night woman, 
a malignant cuckoo-like parasite who deceives him, takes his time, his affection, and all of his 
productive resources. Unless he can come to see her for what she really is, she will suck the 
vitality out of him and leave him broken, or more likely dead. Any children born to their union 
will be parasitic creatures, voraciously devouring everything in sight, reducing their unwitting 
father to ruin. Yet the more his neighbours and kin worry, the deeper Jorge is sucked in, the 
deeper he falls in love. 
 
§ § § 
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Changelings, of one kind or another, are among us and one effect of exploring them is to make 
you see them wherever you turn. From the English boy who suddenly appears to his father as 
a ISIS flag-wielding jihadi in Syria, to the beloved TV presenters of the 1980s now revealed as 
paedophiles, the potential to be profoundly and tragically mistaken about whom we think we 
know is an integral part of any social relation.3 Changelings, or more accurately a changeling 
dynamic, proliferate because quite literally anybody can be one. In this essay, I want to explore 
this potential as a key component of any and indeed all social relations, for the changeling 
phenomena, despite its cultural and historical specificity, nevertheless draws our attention to 
the ubiquitous capacity for alterity to erupt from within even the most intimate relation. In 
addressing this issue, I will attempt to highlight two key points: first, I would like to reassert 
the role of alterity as a fundamental component in all social relations, and second, I would like 
to suggest that, perhaps counter-intuitively, this alterity can be apprehended as much through 
similarity as through difference.  
I will return to each of these points in due course, but to give the reader some 
indication of the direction of the essay, the first point is concerned with the fact that although 
the constitutive role of alterity in social relations has been forcefully argued for several non-
Western contexts, such as Rupert Stasch’s work on Melanesia, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s 
work on Amazonia, or Peter Geschiere’s work on Africa, these positions have explicitly gone 
against the grain of an implicit, default assumption that social relations are premised on a 
benign similarity.4 All of the above mentioned authors describe contexts in which alterity is 
intrinsic to social relations, rather than simply what occurs in their absence. In doing so, both 
Stasch and Geschiere highlight alternative genealogies of sociality in Western thought, ones 
in which influential essays like Freud’s The Uncanny (2003 [1919])or Simmel’s The Stranger 
(1971 [1908]) play a key role.5 One of the goals of this essay is to provide a further example of 
the relevance of this approach to a European context. The second, somewhat related point 
that I want to make is that our thinking needs to go beyond a simple opposition of difference 
and identity if it is to fully comprehend alterity within social relations. Again, I am following 
other recent scholarship in arguing that similarity may itself index alterity. Take, for example, 
Toby Kelly’s work on doctors’ evaluations of asylum seekers claiming experiences of torture.6 
Far from rejecting claims because of the “otherness” of the purported victims, doctors’ 
scepticism is located precisely in recognizing their own ability to deceive in the other. As Kelly 
notes, “the denial of another’s suffering is not always about a failure to recognize mutual 
humanity. It can also be a product of a sense of fundamental similarity, based on assumptions 
about the mutual capacity to dissimulate”.7 In this essay, I will focus primarily on the 
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changeling phenomenon as it occurs in both Irish and Scottish Gaelic culture, although I will 
return to southern Chile and the broader implications of thinking about alterity within 
relations later on. For although the cases I am going to discuss may well appear either 
culturally and temporally remote, exotic if you will, I do think that a similar dynamic of alterity 
to that present in the changeling encounter is also present in many far more mundane cases 
far closer to home. 
The Case of Bridget Cleary 
 
Cleary’s death has been the focus of intense scholarly and public interest, at least in 
part because of the sheer weight of contemporary evidence available – from police records, 
court transcripts of eyewitness statements, and numerous articles in the newspapers of the 
time, to oral histories in Tipperary today. At least two full-length monographs, a dozen or so 
academic journal articles, a documentary, and a successful stage play, have explored the 
events of those fateful days in unremitting detail. And the scholarship surrounding the case 
has been of an incredibly high standard; Angela Bourke’s book The Burning of Bridget Cleary 
won the Irish Times Non-Fiction Prize, and is certainly one of the most thorough and 
compelling works of social history that I have read.  
The analytical foci of the works surrounding Cleary’s death are primarily concerned 
with first, colonialism and media, and second, shifting gender roles. The first approach 
highlights the fact that Bridget Cleary’s death occurred just as the Irish Home Rule Bill was 
being debated in the British parliament. Much of the opposition to Irish home rule focused on 
the assertion that the Irish simply were not fit to govern themselves, a fact supposedly 
indexed by the prevalence of purportedly barbaric pre-Christian superstitions. Proponents of 
home rule, on the other hand, emphasized state failures of care, and the marginalization of 
the rural poor. Social historians interested in the case have traced the perfect political 
alignment of both local and national newspapers with their reporting of the case.8 So whereas 
unionist papers emphasize savagery and superstition, nationalist newspapers portray those 
involved as highly idiosyncratic and isolated individuals, let down by the negligence of the 
British state. Hand in hand with its political implications, the case also brings to the fore rapidly 
changing gender roles in rural Ireland. Thus much has been made of the fact that Bridget 
Clearly was, highly unusually for the time, but rapidly becoming less so, a woman of 
independent means. She had a trade, as a seamstress, and she had the means of production 
(a sewing machine) to make that trade pay handsomely. We learn of rumours circulating 
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widely of her infidelity and unrestrained sexuality, a well-known and widely-used ploy for 
putting women “back in their place.” 
The thoroughness of the research behind these points is such that, in many ways, 
there really is not much more to add. The case of Cleary clearly fed into political debates as a 
kind of metonym for the rural Irish population as a whole, and likewise, Cleary’s refusal to 
accept the staunchly conservative gendered norms of rural Tipperary heightened her 
vulnerability. But what I want to focus on in this essay, is neither the politics of gender nor the 
politics of colonialism, but rather the inherently complex and shifting micro-politics of alterity 
at play within Cleary herself. “Are you Bridget Cleary?” her kin repeatedly ask her. What would 
cause a father to ask such a question of his daughter, or a husband such a question of his wife? 
How could this woman whom they had known her entire life suddenly appear as someone 
else?  
 
Fairies and Alterity 
 
The term “fairy” is, as many commentators have pointed out, a poor and somewhat 
misleading translation of the Gaelic root concept, sìth in both Irish and Scottish Gaelic (Black, 
2013; Narvaez, 1991).9 The sparkling, fluttering, Tinkerbell-esque creatures familiar to Disney 
viewers are very much the products of a nineteenth century romantic (and commercial) 
imagination.10 Put simply, fairies were the essence of Gaelic alterity. They were omni-present 
features of cultural, social, and physical landscapes. Thus every district had its cnoc an t-sìth 
or “fairy hill” under which fairies dwelt, and through which humans might pass into their 
realm. Many of the most popular tunes on both bagpipe and fiddle in contemporary Scottish 
traditional music are said to have been composed by fairies, and either traded with or gifted 
to humans.11 Fairies were held to be neither good nor bad, neither moral nor immoral, but 
fundamentally amoral and self-serving, as likely to hinder as to help. It is important to point 
out that while fairy belief coexisted with witchcraft beliefs, they were very far from the same 
thing; fairies are at a tangent to witches, and many of the defenses against witches would not 
be effective against fairies, and vice versa. 
A large proportion of Irish and Scottish folklore is concerned with fairies, yet the 
question of what, exactly, fairies are escapes a definitive answer due to the diversity of 
explanations in the existent sources. Some see them as a distant cultural memory of the 
remnants of an autochthonous pre-Celtic population, a kind of pseudo-historical explanation 
which ties fairies’ well-known abhorrence of iron to their displacement by iron-wielding Celtic-
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speaking tribes in the millennium before Christ. Other sources portray fairies as angels hurled 
from Heaven alongside Lucifer, but repenting halfway down to Hell, thus trapped just under 
the surface of this world. Robert Kirk’s famous 17th century treatise The Secret Commonwealth 
of the Elves, Fauns, and Fairies presents a view of fairies immediately familiar to me from my 
previous research in indigenous South America, in which fairies are simply the double of living 
humans. 12They live in a parallel world organized along identical lines to our own. But what 
are bread and wine in their world, are revealed as excrement and urine in our own. There is 
thus a great diversity to fairy beliefs across the Gaelic-speaking world, but also a certain 
consistency. Fairies are very old, fairly grumpy, they hate iron and fire, but they are incredibly 
musical. They dwell in specific locations in the landscape, often remains of prehistoric forts or 
burial mounds. The key feature I want to draw out for the purposes of this essay, is that they 
are simultaneously like us and not like us. They are motivated by the same passions, but the 
contours of the world in which these passions are played out are fundamentally different. To 
be truly other, they must also be somewhat the same, a point to which I will return. 
 
Changelings in Gaelic culture 
 
The case of Bridget Cleary mentioned above is probably the best-known, and certainly the 
best-documented case of fairy changelings of which I am aware. Yet it is far, far from unique. 
Indeed, the idea of changelings has a wide geographical and historical spread. Martin Luther, 
for example, famously urged local authorities in Anhalt in Germany to throw a “changeling” 
infant into the river.13 Yet despite their appearance across Europe (and indeed, beyond) it 
seems that ideas about changelings were particularly elaborated within Celtic language areas, 
thus several accounts describe changelings in Brittany, Cornwall, and Wales.14 In this essay, 
however, I want to focus specifically on changelings within the Gaelic culture of Ireland and 
Scotland, and in doing so I draw heavily on Ronald Black’s invaluable edition of John Gregorson 
Campbell’s writings on the topic.15 
 A typical account comes from Glengarry, and was published in 1910, though 
presumably relates to events somewhat earlier: “There was a widow in Glengarry who had a 
baby boy. One day when he was sleeping quietly in his cradle she went to the well for water, 
and when she got back he was screaming as if in great pain. She gave him a drink as quickly 
as she could […] She gave him another drink, and this time while he was at her breast she 
noticed that he had two teeth, each more than an inch long, and that his face was looking old 
and withered. She said to herself,  “I’m finished now. But I’ll keep quiet and see what comes of 
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this.” Next day she picked up the baby, covered him with a shawl and set off as if she was 
bringing him to the next township. There was a big burn in the way, and as she was wading 
through the ford, the wizened creature stuck his head out of the shawl and said “Many a big 
fold [of sheep] have I seen on the banks of this stream.” She did not wait to hear any more. 
She threw the baby into a deep pool below the ford, where he tossed about in the swirling 
water, screaming that “if he had known in advance that was the trick she was going to play 
on him, he would have shown her another.’ Then she heard a sound like a flock of birds, but 
saw nothing until she looked at her feet, and there was her own baby.”16 
 Put simply, a changeling – tàcharan in Scottish Gàidhlig and sìbheire in Irish Gaelic – 
is a creature of fairy origin who takes the place of a human. Although there’s great diversity 
within accounts of changelings, there are some recurring features or characteristics:  
Age: Changelings are frequently (although not always, as we have seen with the case 
of Cleary above) infants, and the accompanying stories tell of babies replaced with fairy 
infants, while their mothers were fetching water from the well. Despite being physically 
identical to the stolen infants, changelings frequently give both verbal and physical clues to 
their age – they quickly grow teeth or have a wizened appearance, and several accounts reveal 
that they cannot help themselves but boast of their great age and all that they have seen. 
Appetite: A second characteristic is the voraciousness of the changeling. This is 
manifest in two ways: either they eat too much, or they refuse human food. So many accounts 
speak of the voraciousness of changelings who can never be satiated, while others speak of 
changelings’ desire for strange foods. For example, a woman near Loughrea in Ireland told the 
folklorist Lady Gregory: “There was a fairy in a house in Eserkelly fourteen years. Bridget Collins 
she was called […] she never kept the bed, but she’d sit in the corner of the kitchen on a mat, 
and from a good stout lump of a girl that she was, she wasted to nothing, and her teeth grew 
as long as your finger, and then they dropped out. And she’d eat nothing at all, only crabs and 
sour things.”17 And, as we shall see when we return to the case of Cleary, it is ultimately her 
refusal to eat jam and bread for a third time which seems to clinch the case against her. 
Fire and Iron: A third characteristic of all changelings, and one which reveals their fairy 
nature, is that they are utterly petrified of both fire and iron. This is revealing of their fairy 
origin, and the surest way to “out” a changeling is to threaten them with fire, as again we will 
see in the case of Cleary. 
Language: The true language of fairies is more or less unintelligible to humans, 
although it does appear in many traditional songs sung in both Ireland and Scotland to this 
day. An example from Campbell’s compendium of Gaelic occult belief tells of a changeling 
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who, upon meeting another changeling while the human mother eavesdrops from a cupboard 
says: “The muggle maggle/wants the loan of the black luggle laggle/to take the maggle from 
the grain.”18 
Physical: changelings are also marked by very slight deviations from the physical 
norm, such as one leg being slightly longer than the other. Michael Cleary tells his neighbour 
of Bridget: “She was not my wife. She was too fine to be my wife; she was two inches taller 
than my wife!” 
 
Interestingly, accounts of changelings are not confined to the folktales of oral tradition, but 
pass consistently into the historical record. Their perceived prevalence across huge swathes 
of rural Scotland is indicated by the fact that, for example, in the eighteenth century kirk poor 
records for Ardnamurchan, several individuals receiving poor support from the church have 
“Changeling” written in the “Remarks” column next to their names.19 
There is not surprisingly a great deal of lore on how to deal with changelings, and here 
we see something of a divergence in Irish and Scottish traditions. In Scotland it appears as 
though abandonment was the primary strategy. The changeling would be abandoned in some 
desolate spot, occasionally a beach or a crossroads, and its fairy kin would take pity upon it, 
rescue it, and thus be compelled to return the stolen human back to its home. So in 1862, Dr 
Arthur Mitchell, a man with the enviable job title of Deputy Commissioner for Lunacy in 
Scotland, tells of a child “who is believed to be a changeling of the fairies, who are supposed 
to steal away the human child, and leave for it one of their own young-old children to be 
nursed. I know of two idiots in one of the Western Islands exactly of the same character, and 
also believed to be changelings of the fairies. The only remedy for this of which I heard, is to 
place the changeling on the beach by the water side, when the tide is out, and pay no attention 
to its screams. The fairies, rather than suffer their own to be drowned by the rising waters, 
spirit it away, and restore the child they had stolen”20 (1862: 286). In Ireland, the traditional 
way to deal with a changeling was with fire. In both the case of abandonment and burning, 
the death or flight of the changeling would automatically lead to the return of the abducted 
human, or at least the possibility of this return. 
Scholarship on changelings has, for the most part, sought to explain changelings. As 
we have seen from the earlier discussion of the Cleary case, both the politics of colonialism 
and the politics of gender have been posited as explanatory factors. Yet perhaps the most 
established and widespread explanation of changelings as a general phenomenon is as a 
culturally-specific idiom in which to talk about disability.21 A variety of physical and 
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psychological disorders may effect the sudden transformation of people we know into people 
we do not know. Scholars such as Eberley go further, trying to tie the specificities of 
changelings’ appearance and behaviour to specific conditions: thus premature aging, 
uncontrolled appetites, elongated teeth, etc, can all be tied to symptoms of a variety of 
medically-recognized ailments.22 A different perspective, but one which also, to a certain 
extent “explains away” changelings would be that of a scholar such as Ronald Black who links 
the changeling phenomenon to the famine, constant malnutrition, and high rates of infant 
mortality widespread in large parts of Ireland and Scotland throughout the 18th and 19th 
centuries. And to drag the reader briefly back over to the other side of the Atlantic, we can 
see that the Mapuche changeling, the night woman or pun domo, can also be approached 
from the perspective of the politics of gender. Rural Mapuche society is in many ways quite 
patriarchal, and in its insistence on virilocal post-marital residence, women frequently find 
themselves in the position of potentially-divisive outsiders. While not doubting the salience 
of an explanation of pun domo as a commentary on the place of women in rural Mapuche 
society, again it leaves much out of the picture.23  
Each of these approaches has something to be said for it, and each, I think, offers a 
partial but never a complete explanation for the phenomenon. In this essay, I take a different 
tack, for my concern here is not in any way to explain changelings, but rather to explore the 
internal micro-politics of the changeling encounter. In other words, I am more concerned with 
the how the phenomenon works rather than with what the phenomenon is. Rather than 
explaining changelings away, I am interested in what the complex interplay of alterity with 
difference and similarity exemplified within the changeling encounter, can reveal to us about 
human relationships more generally. Such an approach gives the changeling phenomena a 
degree of autonomy from the social, cultural, and historical contexts in which it occurs. This 
is not to say that one must believe the phenomena to be “true”, nor is it even to hold that 
those contemporary to the event held it to be “true”, but simply that it possesses its own 
internal logic. It is this logic which I now go on to describe. 
 
Micropolitics of Changeling alterity 
 
What do I mean by “alterity” and “difference”, two terms often treated as near synonyms? I 
am using “alterity” to refer to a fundamentally distinct state of being (in the Gaelic case, 
“fairy”, in the Mapuche case, pun domo, but many other states could apply: 
“”fundamentalist,” “paedophile,” etc.), and I am using “difference” and “similarity” as 
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perceived indices of the relative proximity of that state. Thus a perceived marker of difference, 
such as one leg being slightly shorter than the other, is not in itself a condition of alterity, but 
may be interpretively constructed as an index of it. What I want to try and show is that alterity 
is premised as much on indices of similarity as it is on difference; or rather, it is a particular 
combination of difference and similarity which index alterity.24 I will try to demonstrate this 
within the case of changelings in Gaelic culture, but I would like to speculate that this 
configuration is particular to relationships more generally. So what are the markers of 
difference and similarity in the case of changelings? For the sake of simplicity and the 
abundance of available data, I am going to focus on the Cleary case, drawing in particular on 
Angela Bourke’s book The Burning of Bridget Cleary. 
Bridget Cleary had been bed-ridden for several days, most probably with bronchitis. 
She was running a high fever, and became delirious. The doctor was called, but did not come 
for several days, and when he did finally arrive, he was drunk and became embroiled in a row 
with Bridget’s husband Michael Cleary. The priest, too, was called, and eventually came. He 
gave Bridget the last rites, not because he thought death imminent, but as a “precautionary 
measure” and it is at this point that things start to unravel. Several of her cousins, present at 
these last rites claimed that once the priest’s back was turned, Bridget spat out the host and 
secreted it under the bed sheets. When the local healer or “fairy doctor” Jack Dunne, a man 
who had known Bridget since birth, arrived, he immediately exclaimed “That is not Bridgie 
Boland!” Others started to share his doubts. A variety of questions are put to Bridget. Her 
father, Patrick Boland asks “Are you the daughter of Patrick Boland, wife of Michael Cleary? 
Answer in the name of God!” “I am Dada, I am the daughter of Pat Boland, in the name of 
God! “He’s making a fairy of me,” says Bridget. Over and over again, the people present ask 
her who she really is. Yet her confirmations do not help her situation, if anything they seem 
to anger her family even more. As language is a capacity shared with fairies, it cannot alone 
verify Bridget’s humanity. Once the capacity for language is exhausted, those present turn to 
physical means, threatening her with fire.  
 “For the love of God, don’t burn your wife” says James Kennedy, Bridget’s cousin, to 
Michael. “She’s not my wife. She’s an old deceiver sent in place of my wife. She’s after 
deceiving me for the last seven or eight days, and deceived the priest today, too, but she won’t 
deceive anyone any more,” replies Michael. The final straw is Bridget’s refusal to eat bread 
and jam for a third time. The indices of difference accumulate: she seems two inches taller; 
she is averse to the Christian sacrament; she is averse to human food; and she cannot do 
anything for a third time. Yet each index of difference is held in place by one of similarity: she 
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provides positive responses when asked if she is Bridget; she still looks like Bridget; she stays 
in human form. Bridget is like Bridget, but not Bridget. Her undeniable similarities to Bridget 
cast her as somebody deliberately out to deceive, while her differences mark her out as 
something altogether foreign. Eventually Cleary kills Bridget, knocking her unconscious, and 
setting her on fire. When her relatives protest, he says “You are a dirty set. You would rather 
have her with the fairies in Kylenagranagh fort than have her here with me.” He goes on to 
assure her father that they will have the opportunity to rescue the real Bridget at dawn the 
following Sunday, when she would ride out from Kylenagranagh on a white horse. Yet by then, 
nobody could save Bridget. Her family were all imprisoned, and eventually sentenced with 
varying degrees of severity. Michael Cleary served fifteen years in prison, and upon his release 
in 1910 emigrated via Liverpool to Montreal, Canada still apparently insistent that it was not 
the real Bridget whom he had killed. 
As stated already, I am not going to try and explain the changeling phenomenon, nor 
am I going to try and explain the particularities of the Cleary case. It seems to have been a 
“perfect storm” of disastrous conjunctions and coincidences in which, in Angela Bourke’s 
words “nobody is entirely to blame, or entirely innocent”.25 What strikes me is how alterity 
can erupt so suddenly and so violently from within a kinship relation – remember that this is 
as closely-knit a rural community as one can imagine, every one of the protagonists had known 
the other their entire lives. So the question is, how do these relationships, which at first sight 
are the very epitome of a benign sociality premised on shared conviviality, shared 
commensality, and shared consubstantiality, collapse so suddenly into something else?26 How 
do people, quite literally in the case of Cleary, become “dehumanized”? I want to turn back 
briefly to the Mapuche case, to see if certain points of comparison can highlight a central 
dynamic. 
I will not be engaging in a point by point comparison, for my purpose is primarily to 
highlight certain continuities, but it is nevertheless necessary to mention the many undeniably 
salient differences. Such differences would include, first, the fact that in the Gaelic case it is 
the closest family who doubt the kin/changeling, and the neighbours who do not, while in the 
Mapuche case it is the person closest, the husband, who is deceived while the neighbours see 
the pun domo for what it really is. Perhaps more significant is the fact that in the Gaelic case, 
the person replaced is actual, while in the Mapuche case it is virtual. In other words, there 
was an actual Bridget Cleary somewhere, under the fort at Kylenagranagh, who had been 
replaced, yet in the Mapuche case, the pun domo does not replace an actual spouse, but 
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simply negates the potential for the man to ever marry and enter into a productive 
relationship.27  
Despite these differences, I think both the Gaelic changeling and the Mapuche pun 
domo can, to a certain extent, be approached from the perspective of a shared dynamic of 
alterity. It might be useful here, to think of the “uncanny” which, according to Freud arises 
precisely from slight deviations from the familiar, for it is only those things with which we are 
already familiar and accustomed that hold the potential to become uncanny.28 Changelings, 
of course, are permanent denizens of this uncanny state, so similar and familiar, yet marked 
by the slightest indices of alterity. Perhaps we can take Freud’s uncanny and cast it in slightly 
different terms, and fit it out for a slightly different purpose. For what I would like to do in 
closing is to explore what the uncanniness of changelings might tell us about a particular kind 
of human sociality: kinship. This will allow us to address how this dynamic allows alterity to 
erupt within the most intimate and close relationships. 
An increasingly influential contribution to debates about the interplay of difference 
and similarity in kinship is Marshall Sahlins’ recent assertion that “what kinship is all about” is 
“mutuality of being”, and by “mutuality of being” Sahlins is referring to “people who are 
intrinsic to one another’s existence – thus ‘mutual person(s)’, ‘life itself ’, ‘intersubjective 
belonging’.29 He says that “‘mutuality of being’ will cover the variety of ethnographically 
documented ways kinship is locally constituted, whether by procreation, social construction, 
or some combination of these."30 He goes on to specify that this theory of kinship is manifest 
in the fact that "kinsmen are people who live each other’s lives and die each other’s deaths. 
To the extent they lead common lives, they partake of each other’s sufferings and joys, sharing 
one another’s experiences even as they take responsibility for and feel the effects of each 
other’s acts".31 And he is surely correct that “mutuality of being” is a large part of what kinship 
is. But it is not, I would suggest, all that kinship is.32 For Sahlins’ position, while not exactly 
proclaiming identity-based kinship as the default model of what kinship is, does seem to be 
foregrounding “mutuality”, or what is shared, as the defining feature of “what kinship is all 
about,” a position which, following writers such as Geschiere, Stasch, and Viveiros de Castro, 
I want to suggest tells only half the story.33 
The problem is perhaps that Sahlins’ approach closes down the possibility that 
difference emerges out of the kinship relation. To a certain degree, I’m arguing along similar 
lines to Lévi-Strauss’s famous argument about the incest taboo, the post-hoc insertion of 
alterity, in order to make kinship possible.34 In essence, a particular kind of mutuality of being 
is, for Lévi-Strauss at least, anything but “what kinship is all about” it is that which must be 
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overcome, must be proscribed against in order for kinship to emerge. Sahlins himself isn’t too 
far from saying this when he says that “the work of culture is to delimit and differentiate the 
human potential for transpersonal being into determinate kinship relations”.35 But can we 
really oppose culture and kinship? I would suggest that the “differentiation” is best 
conceptualized not as an external source acting upon kinship, but as already within kinship. 
To understand how alterity can reside within kinship, we need to differentiate 
between two slightly different forms of alterity which become neutralized or obfuscated 
within Sahlins’ model. The first of these is the kind of radical, and usually sinister, alterity of 
which the potential to be something dangerous and other as in the case of the Cleary 
changeling or the Mapuche pun domo, predominates. Sahlins points out that “as the 
malevolent consumption or penetration of the body of the other, witchcraft and sorcery are 
rather, by definition, negative kinship”.36 The second is simply affinity, brought about by the 
incest taboo’s compulsion for us to engage with people who are in, at least some respects, 
fundamentally “other.” Put simply, in Sahlins’ model affinity is absorbed into mutuality, while 
“occult” practices are excluded from kinship. I suggest that the former is an encompassment 
too far, the latter an exclusion too near. I want to understand the place of alterity – whether 
in terms of affinity, or in terms of the more sinister potential of the occult – as internal to what 
kinship “is all about.” 
You may at this stage be feeling a certain sense of deja-vu for we do seem to be falling 
into a recurring pattern in the history of kinship studies. Take the famous descent vs. alliance 
debate for example, the former emphasizing “mutuality of being”, the latter emphasizing a 
productive difference founded upon alterity. Looking back at this debate, the obvious 
response is that most versions of kinship are both at the same time. This argument was of 
course primarily played out at the level of corporate groups, but the argument I am pushing 
here is that it equally applies at an intersubjective level – relations are always constituted 
through a constantly shifting configuration of mutuality of being and alterity. Difference and 
similarity cannot be placed in a simple chronology in which one precedes or encompasses the 
other, but are, I would suggest continually emergent properties of any given kinship relation. 
To describe “mutuality of being” as what kinship is all about is, I think, but half of the story. 
To my mind, a more compelling theory of kinship would not exclude “negative kinship” as 
something beyond its perimeters, but engage with it as a fundamental part of “what kinship 
is.” 
Changelings are, and probably always have been, marginal, exotic, ambiguous, and 
unlikely. It is in their very extremity that changelings make certain configurations explicit that 
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most of the time remain implicit. Yet this is not to say that they are no longer relevant or are 
absent, for as I have gestured towards – all too briefly in the space available – is that other 
configurations of alterity raise similar dynamics. The two key points I have tried to make clear 
are, first, that alterity is not simply indexed by difference, but by a complex interplay in which 
similarity is as salient as difference; and second, that this interplay of difference and similarity, 
and the alterity towards which it gestured, is at the very heart of kinship. Mutuality of being 
necessarily goes hand in hand with its antithesis, a possibility just around every corner.  
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